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mat, thereby providing ample room for side glosses and plenty of space for
readers’ annotations. The result of this divergence in format is that the
Dobson-Taylor edition (which contains more material) runs 332 pages
while Knight-Ohlgren comes in at a whopping 723. While both volumes
are illustrated, the Knight-Ohlgren text has 44 to Dobson and Taylor’s 17.
One of the most notable features of this most recent Robin Hood
revival has been its emphasis on pedagogy, including as it has teaching sessions and the distribution of sample syllabi. No doubt this revival will lead
to a wealth of new courses entering the curriculum. In our rush to teach
Robin Hood, each of us must decide what type of courses we are teaching:
Advanced courses in which manuscript issues are appropriate, or courses
where students come with little, or even no, background in the Middle
Ages. Are they to be exclusively or primarily medieval courses or modern
ones? Should the primary focus be on Robin Hood in particular or on the
outlaw genre in general? Do we stress historical particulars or anthropological/folklore universals? Should such courses be modeled on those
treating Arthurian literature which are favorites with nonmajors? The
answers to these questions will most likely dictate the choice of text. What
is obvious is that Robin Hood studies are richer for the choice.

Julian Wasserman
Loyola University, New Orleans

Anna Battigelli. Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind. L e x i n g ton: University Press of Kentucky, 1998.
In an address to the reader of her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666), Margaret Cavendish, duchess of Newcastle (1623–1673)
remarks that her philosophy, being new, is not yet understood, but that
posterity might regard her ideas more highly. Margaret Cavendish’s time
has come. For three centuries or so, Cavendish’s life and writings were all
but forgotten. Today, most of Cavendish’s texts are (or soon will be)
readily available in print or on-line. Many undergraduates, as well as graduate students, are now studying and enjoying her books, especially
Description of a New…Blazing World. During the past two decades, the
patient labor of feminist scholars has not only transformed our understanding of the early modern context in which Cavendish wrote, but has
also articulated interpretative strategies by which her writings might be
read with profit and pleasure. The Margaret Cavendish Society (established in 1997) is a lively international community, which has met twice,
in Oxford (1997) and Paris (1999), and will meet again, in 2001, at
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Wheaton College, Massachusetts. Its members disseminate new research
by means of a list-serve, web-page, and newsletter. The time is indeed ripe
for the publication of a wide range of new assessments of Margaret Cavendish’s unique place in intellectual history.
Anna Battigelli’s Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind is a
new and substantial study of “the life of the mind” of Margaret Cavendish, which demonstrates why Cavendish is now considered an important
seventeenth-century thinker, who both responded to the main ideas of
her time and anticipated many of the trends to come. As the book’s title
indicates, Battigelli’s Cavendish is an intellectual exile, a subject-position
that shaped both her writings and her natural philosophy (84). Her identity as an exile emerged out of her life experiences. Not only did Cavendish live in exile in France and Holland during the 1640s and 1650s, but
after the Restoration, she and her husband were excluded from the centers
of power in London, and so retreated to their estates at Welbeck and Bolsover. Battigelli goes as far as claiming that, after 1660, Cavendish “had
begun to live in the written worlds of her texts rather than in the external
world” (88). As a woman, Cavendish was also barred from intellectual circles, and her writings often articulate a deep alienation from “mode-philosophy,” especially as promoted by the Royal Society (established 1662).
Taken as a whole, Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind sheds
considerable light on Cavendish’s repeated attempts to negotiate access to
the early modern intellectual system, and to find a small measure of collaboration in the life of the mind. In the end, as Battigelli points out, Cavendish turned her position as an exile to advantage and “explored
interiority more openly and more publicly than any other writer of her
time” (85).
Battigelli’s other declared objective is to correct the impression—certainly created by Cavendish herself, as well as by her husband (called
“Newcastle,” for clarity’s sake)—that Cavendish was an entirely original
and isolated thinker. At first glance, this objective may seem at variance
with the depiction of Cavendish as exile, but Battigelli’s book reveals the
very process by which Cavendish became an exile through her lived experience of negotiating various intellectual options. Each of Battigelli’s four
well-researched chapters teases out one significant strand of Cavendish’s
reactions to contemporary philosophical currents: (1) her response to the
Platonic-love ideology of Queen Henrietta Maria; (2) her views on the
new atomism; (3) her implementation and criticism of Hobbesian ideas;
and (4) her critiques of the new science and the Royal Society. One of the
primary virtues of Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind is that,
because of Battigelli’s careful reconstructions of the specific contexts for
specific texts, she is able to suggest exciting new ways to read a number of
Cavendish’s works.
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Chapter 2, “A Strange Enchantment: ‘The Wooing of the Mind’ at
the Court of Henrietta Maria,” is a fine synthesis of an impressive range of
sources, showing that Queen Henrietta Maria influenced the “life of the
mind” of Margaret Cavendish during the 1640s. Battigelli does an admirable job of reconstructing Henrietta Maria’s intellectual contributions to
Caroline court life, while speculating on how the queen’s ideas on Platonic love might have been received by the young Margaret Lucas, who
became a lady-in-waiting in 1643 and later went into exile in France with
her queen. As Battigelli shows, Henrietta Maria’s influence on Margaret
Cavendish went well beyond Cavendish’s well-known penchant for creating her own fantastical fashions, such as were worn by the queen and her
ladies during the Caroline court masques. According to Battigelli,
throughout her life, Cavendish and her husband Newcastle remained
“conscious symbols of a past order” (11). In light of her findings regarding the Henrietta Maria/Cavendish connection, Battigelli is able to provide an exciting rereading of Cavendish’s drama, demonstrating that the
plays not only re-create, but also test, the Platonic love ideals which were
propagated and performed by the queen in the court masques of the
1630s.
The third chapter, “World and Mind in Conflict: Cavendish’s Review
of the New Atomism,” argues that Cavendish’s highly original writings on
atomism, notably Poems and Fancies (1653), reveal the traumatized state
of her mind during the early years of her exile. It is Battigelli’s contention
that the theory of atomism, which was “the rage in Paris” at the time,
appealed to Cavendish precisely because her personal world was disintegrating. Margaret Lucas was psychologically scarred by a series of events
that started with going into forced exile with Henrietta Maria in 1644. In
1647, her beloved mother and sister died. In 1648, after an unsuccessful
attempt to defend Colchester from Parliamentary forces under General
Thomas Fairfax, her brother Charles Lucas was court-martialled and summarily shot. Afterwards, a mob desecrated the Lucas family plot, scattering
the remains of her mother and sister. Even the happiness of the early years
of her marriage to William Cavendish, viscount of Newcastle, was marred
by vicious court gossip and by continuing financial difficulties, especially
after 1649, when Parliament declared Newcastle an enemy to the English
state and confiscated his lands. Battigelli suggests that Cavendish’s lifelong melancholia may have dated from this period. At the same time, however, Cavendish’s early years of marriage brought her the intellectual stimulation of her husband’s company and, until his early death, that of
Charles Cavendish, Newcastle’s learned brother. Both brothers acted as
tutors to the young bride, and also introduced her to the Cavendish circle
in Paris, which, at times, included such luminaries as Gassendi, Hobbes,
and Descartes. But doesn’t Battigelli exaggerate when she asserts that
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Cavendish found herself “at the center of a scientific salon”? Cavendish
often depicted herself, or a textual surrogate, as being too bashful to speak
in company, as not knowing French, and as being on the outskirts of conversation, even within her own family. Other stray comments indicate that
Battigelli sometimes tries too hard to place Cavendish within the wellentrenched contours of Western thought. On rare occasion, Battigelli lets
slip a depreciating remark: “[Cavendish] returned to England promoting
an idiosyncratic version of Cartesian rationalism” (89).
In Battigelli’s view, Cavendish’s atomism is a metaphor for her personal and political problems of the late 1640s and the 1650s; it is “a metaphor that might account for the conflict that governed her mind and her
world” (58). This contention leads Battigelli to a bold rereading of the
Poems and Fancies which not only reiterates Cavendish’s well-known skepticism regarding experimental philosophy, but also argues that the atomistic universe that Cavendish depicts is profoundly pessimistic and
Hobbesian. Battigelli concludes that Cavendish “read a Hobbesian state of
nature into the very fabric of the universe by using the language of war to
describe the actions of atoms” (57). While this claim works well in the reading of such poems as “A Warr with Atomes,” other poems do not confirm
that Cavendish’s vision in Poems and Fancies is “Hobbesian.” Taken as a
whole, Poems and Fancies presents a wide range of witty and outrageous
thought-experiments about alternative realities at the subatomic level,
including fairy realms, thriving commonwealths, and a little world in an
earring where, though battles may be fought, birds may also sing.
In the fourth chapter, “No House but My Mind,” Battigelli seems
determined to establish Thomas Hobbes as a looming presence behind
Cavendish’s work (63). At one point, Battigelli even insists: “she was more
of a Hobbesian than Hobbes” (83). Is it fruitful to frame Cavendish’s
work in this way? Admittedly, Cavendish’s well-known claim to be an
absolutely original thinker cannot be taken at face value. And who could
object to saying that Cavendish and Hobbes are similar in their determination to be speculative philosophers; they both rejected the systems of
scholasticism and experimental philosophy in order—in Hobbes’s
words—“to prove everything in my own way” (68). And Battigelli locates
lots of resonances in their writings; they are said to share everything from
concerns with the problem of public order and ethical relativism to a pessimistic view of human nature. But then many of their contemporaries
shared similar ideas. To set up a compelling argument for Hobbes’s influence on Margaret Cavendish, Battigelli goes to some length to prove the
“intimacy” between Hobbes and Newcastle: Hobbes is called a “deeply
valued friend”; Newcastle is said to have been “intensely engaged with
Hobbes’s thought” (64–65). Doubtless, Hobbes had a long-standing
relationship with Newcastle; he was the tutor and a member of the house-
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hold of Newcastle’s cousin, the second earl of Devonshire. Hobbes no
doubt appreciated and acknowledged Newcastle’s patronage. And, arguably, Newcastle may have been influenced by Hobbesian ideas of statesmanship when he wrote his letter of advice to Charles II. But whatever we
grant in the case of a relationship between Newcastle and Hobbes, the evidence that Hobbes had a profound influence on Margaret Cavendish
remains questionable. Even if Newcastle schooled her in Hobbes’s
thought—and there is little evidence that he did—I wonder how those
ideas might have been played out in their conversations, given the wonderful quirkiness of Newcastle’s wit and Cavendish’s too.
As Battigelli reminds us, we have evidence for only two direct communications between Cavendish and Hobbes (65). In the first instance, when
they met accidentally in London in 1653, Hobbes refused a dinner
engagement—as Cavendish reports in Philosophical and Physical Opinions—“with great civility” (sig. B3v.). The second piece of evidence is a
letter Hobbes wrote to Cavendish, in 1662, thanking her for the copy of
her Plays that Cavendish sent him. Based on the slight evidence of
Hobbes’s letter, Battigelli says that Cavendish was attempting to insinuate
herself into a relationship with Hobbes, and even resorts to calling Cavendish “a would-be disciple” (65). The letter in question appears in Letters
and Poems in Honour of the Incomparable Princess, Margaret, Dutchess of
Newcastle (1676), published by her husband after her death. Like so many
of the letters in that collection addressed to Cavendish by famous men,
Hobbes’s letter is characterized by equivocal phraseology, poised somewhere between a compliment to “your Excellence” and barely veiled condescension to a scribbling woman. Battigelli describes Hobbes’s two cool
responses to Cavendish as keeping his “distance” (65). At the very least,
his rebuffs show that, whatever Hobbes’s relationship with Newcastle was,
it was not easily transferable to his young wife.
The final chapter, “Rationalism versus Experimentalism: Cavendish’s
Satires of the Royal Society,” is more balanced in mapping possible influences and in seeking to identify Margaret Cavendish’s “place among the
theorists of the new science” (98). It presents a fine analysis of the commonalities between Observations upon Experimental Philosophy and
Description of a New Blazing World, which were published as companion
pieces in 1666 and again in 1668. Whatever misgivings I have about Battigelli’s claim in earlier chapters for a looming Hobbesian influence, here I
enjoyed her more nuanced treatment of Blazing World as a utopian experiment in statescraft that both deploys and assesses Hobbesian ideas on
political stability. Among the jewels in this chapter is Battigelli’s review of
Cavendish’s extended attack on the Royal Society and, in particular, of
Robert Hooke’s Micrographia in Observations. Nor does Battigelli take
Pepys’s word for it that, during her famous visit to the Royal Society in
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1667, Cavendish was reduced to “admiring silence” when viewing the
experimental entertainments (112). In her analysis of Philosophical Letters
(1664), Battigelli admits that Henry More, Descartes, and Jan Baptista
Van Helmont—as well as Hobbes—were the targets of Cavendish’s critical
pen. Cavendish uses these four figures, negatively, as indicators of what her
natural philosophy was not. The picture of Cavendish presented in the
final chapter is of a woman engaged in an effort—not to become anyone’s
disciple—but to gain some measure of intellectual conversation and recognition, beyond her own family circle. She attempted a correspondence not
only with Hobbes, but also with a number of leading lights, including
Huygens, Henry More, and Joseph Glanvill; she sent beautifully bound
presentation copies of her writings to Oxford and Cambridge Universities
and to many individuals, and she finagled an invitation to view experiments at the Royal Society.
Battigelli writes well, handling diverse, interdisciplinary sources with
admirable grace and clarity. Her notes are rich in scholarly detail and contain many insights in their own right. Appendix A provides a good review
of the evidence for considering 1623 as the birth year for Margaret Lucas.
Appendix B transcribes twenty-one letters written by Margaret Lucas to
Newcastle during their courtship in 1645 [British Library, MS Additional
70499 fols. 259-97]. Before concluding, however, I need to lament that
Battigelli’s study omits any serious consideration of the girlhood of Margaret Lucas. Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind is a slim volume,
in which the introduction and chapter 1 are conflated into one unit of only
ten pages. Despite Battigelli’s admission that Cavendish started writing
well before she went to court, Cavendish’s early life is dealt with in a perfunctory paragraph in the introduction/chapter 1. Thus, the book gives
the odd impression that Cavendish’s “life of the mind” began only when
she entered Henrietta Maria’s service in 1643. The omission is all the
more glaring given that Cavendish’s own account of her upbringing,
found in her autobiographical True Relation, stresses the early influence of
her family, especially of her mother, Elizabeth Lucas. I also would have
welcomed a section that speculated on Cavendish’s intellectual connections while she was in Antwerp during the 1650s.
Chief among Battigelli’s accomplishments is her bold and detailed
study of how Cavendish’s concept of mind is manifested in her writings.
According to Battigelli, both Cavendish’s natural philosophy and her
writing experiments were calculated to capture the conflicted nature of
thinking. In my view, Battigelli overuses the phrase “the disputatious
nature of the human mind” to characterize Cavendish’s understanding
of the mind (79 twice, 83, 149). This characterization works for some
texts, such as “An Argumentative Discourse,” the preface to Observation
on Experimental Philosophy, in which Cavendish deliberately represents
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new and old thoughts as being at war in her mind. Generally, though, in
Cavendish’s writings, the mind is likened to Nature, which, though various and wild, is not necessarily in conflict with herself. Nature enjoys
exercising herself in multiple ways, sometimes to delude ambitious seekers after her truths. Likewise, Cavendish herself enjoys playing with
diversity, letting herself be hard to follow, and tricking crabbed readers.
Her sense of humor is yet to be fully understood. At its best, Battigelli’s
Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind reminds us of Cavendish’s
unique ability to represent—in both her natural philosophy and in her
writing style—the fascinating workings of one human mind at a particular moment in history. It is to Battigelli’s great credit that, while showing
the influences of other thinkers, she honors the Cavendish whose writings openly acknowledge the changeable and elusive qualities of the
mind. Battigelli puts it this way: “Her candour in displaying the chaotic
activity of the thinking life is no doubt one of the most striking and
unsettling characteristics of her work” (58).

Sylvia Bowerbank
McMaster University

Susanne Woods. Lanyer: A Renaissance Woman Poet. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999. xvi + 198 pp.
The object of this excellent full-length treatment of Aemilia Lanyer’s
life and poetry is clearly stated by Susanne Woods at the end of her first
chapter: to “[situate] the first self-proclaimed public woman poet in
English among the equally ambitious men of her time” (41). To this end,
Wood marshals her considerable archival skills and critical expertise to,
first, shape the biography of this woman writer who lived “on the margins” of power during the last years of Elizabeth’s reign and almost the
first fifty years of the next century, and second, to position this writer’s
self-representation and literary works in a dialogue with generically similar
works by several of the best known male writers of the age. In her book,
Woods provides us an exemplary model for the feminist enterprise of
recovering neglected women writers and for reassessing and rewriting literary history.
The skeleton facts of Aemilia Bassano Lanyer’s life are generally well
known: the daughter of a Venetian-born court musician and his English
common-law wife, she was born in 1569. For a brief time in the early
1590s, she was the mistress of Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon. When she
became pregnant with his child, she was married to another musician,

